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Abstract. One of the forerunners and main candidates for the fourth generation (4G)
generation mobile communication system is commonly known under the name Long-Term
Evolution (LTE) and its standard is produced and maintained by the international 3rd
Generation Partnership Program (3GPP) consortium. The LTE Authentication and Key
Agreement (AKA) protocol design is based on the Universal Mobile Telecommunications
System (UMTS) AKA protocol, which is widely used today for third generation (3G) wireless
networks, and which itself is the successor of the Subscriber Identity Authentication (SIA)
protocol of the Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM). With the persistent spread
of these mobile network systems, their authentication protocols have become some of the
most widely used security protocols today. We present a computational security analysis of
both the LTE AKA and the UMTS AKA. This work constitutes the first security analysis
of LTE AKA to date and the first computationally sound analysis of UMTS AKA. Our
work is the first formal analysis to consider messages that are sent in the core network,
where we take into account details of the carrying protocol (i.e., MAP or Diameter) and
of the mechanism for secure transport (i.e., MAPsec/TCAPsec or IPsec ESP). Moreover,
we report on a deficiency in the protocol specifications of UMTS AKA and LTE AKA and
the specifications of the core network security (called network domain security), which may
enable efficient attacks. The vulnerability can be exploited by both an outside and an inside
attacker who can violate entity authentication properties. It allows an inside attacker not
only to impersonate an honest protocol participant during a run of the protocol but also to
subsequently use wireless services on his behalf. UMTS AKA run over MAP with MAPsec
seems vulnerable in the most straight-forward application of the attack. On the other hand,
our analysis shows that UMTS and LTE AKA over Diameter/IPsec and UMTS AKA over
MAP/TCAPsec (with sufficiently long session identifiers) computationally satisfy intended
authentication properties as well as some key secrecy properties, assuming that the used
primitives meet standard cryptographic assumptions.
Keywords: Mobile Communication Systems, LTE, EPS, 4G, UMTS, 3G, GSM, 2G, Crypto-
graphic Protocols, Authentication, Key Agreement, Vulnerability, Attack
1 Introduction
These are exciting times in the development of mobile networks. The GSM and UMTS mobile
networks are a worldwide success with now about 6 billion supscriptions [40], and still growing.
The pace of innovation in mobile terminal hardware and software is amazing, where touch screen
and online packet switched internet access have become a consumer standard. New mobile systems
are rolled out, which include the 3GPP recent developments named ’Long Term Evolution’ (LTE)
and ’System Architecture Evolution’ (SAE). The new system is called ’Evolved Packet System
(EPS), emphasizing the all-IP packet switching design throughout the system unto the user’s
mobile terminal. Although EPS is the proper technical term for this new 3GPP mobile system
generation of SAE/LTE, we will keep with the most well-known name LTE. There is a multitude
of security issues in such large networked systems. Here we will focus on the mobile terminal access
security by means of an authentication and key agreement protocol (AKA) that is structured very
similar in UMTS and LTE. The technical problem we are addressing is to find out whether the
UMTS AKA and LTE AKA are secure with respect to the Computational Model, i.e. the security
model that is used in Modern Cryptography [35,36]. This work constitutes the first computational
analysis of both UMTS AKA and LTE AKA. While there exist formal analyses of UMTS AKA in
the Symbolic Model of security (also called the Dolev-Yao model and inspired by [34]), it is in fact
the first security analysis of LTE AKA to date. While there exist already formal security proofs
for UMTS AKA in the symbolic model, this work provides the first security proofs for LTE AKA
to date. Although the design of LTE AKA is based on UMTS AKA, its security can a priori not be
deduced from the security properties of UMTS AKA as, for instance, the LTE AKA protocol has
been designed to offer stronger authentication guarantees. Furthermore, our proofs are the first
that cover the AKA1 messages sent within the core networks, where we take into account security
details of the protocols over which the UMTS and LTE AKA protocol messages are transported.
Namely, our proofs examine security properties of the UMTS and LTE AKA protocol for the
scenario with the strongest protection described in the UMTS and LTE specifications: within the
core network, the AKA messages are carried over the Mobile Application Part (MAP) protocol [2]
or the Diameter protocol [3,37] and are additionally protected via MAPsec [5] or TCAPsec [6]
(which is the descendant of MAPsec) or IPsec ESP [7]. We note that there are scenarios where the
3GPP specifications [7,5,6] allow network operators to use their proprietary solutions for protecting
core network messages or where the AKA protocols can be executed without any confidentiality
protection. Proprietary solutions can generally not be verified unless explicit details are given2.
And in the case that no confidentiality protection is used in the core network, the exchanged session
keys are exposed and can be eavesdropped, and so there are no meaningful security properties to
prove.
Designing security protocols has proven to be a very error-prone task. There exist many exam-
ples of security protocols that were believed to be secure, usually with respect to the symbolic or
the computational model of security, but that were later shown to be flawed (often in its logical
structure) [47,48,52,29]. Especially ensuring the security of a protocol under concurrent executions
of multiple protocol sessions (runs) is a challenging task in analyzing security protocols by hand.
Therefore, considerable effort has been directed towards the development of tools that can analyze
security protocols in an automatic fashion. There are already several tools that are able to analyze
security protocols with respect to the symbolic model. In particular secrecy and authentication
properties, even of complex protocols, can be shown with a high degree of automation. But also
other properties, e.g. privacy and verifiability properties of electronic voting protocols, can be
handled by such symbolic provers [32,15,18,22,49]. While attacks found against protocols within
the symbolic model, where cryptographic primitives are perfectly secure, immediately translate to
attacks in the computational model, it is not clear what the successful verification of a protocol
in the symbolic model signifies when the security of the protocol is considered in the more fine-
grained computational model where an adversary may attack a protocol via the used primitives.
In order to take advantage of the existing effective tools that work in the symbolic model but,
at the same time, obtain the stronger security guarantees of the computational model, a line of
research focuses on so-called Computationally Sound frameworks, e.g. [16,28,33,31,30]. However,
currently such frameworks lack the tool support yet which would allow proofs without a lot of user
interaction. In recent years, an alternative direction has been taken by building tools that prove
the security of protocols or cryptographic primitives directly in the computational model [25,17].
One such solution, CryptoVerif, has previously been applied to obtain mechanized security proofs
in the computational model of complex real-world protocols such as Kerberos [26] or TLS [21].
We also conduct our analysis of UMTS AKA and LTE AKA with CryptoVerif. Our results are
twofold: On the one hand, we discover a previously undetected vulnerability in the specifications
of both UMTS AKA and LTE AKA and the specifications of the core network security [7,5,6].
1 We sometimes write only AKA when we talk about both UMTS AKA and LTE AKA
2 We do not have any knowledge about proprietary solutions (and their specifics) for protecting core
network AKA messages that deviate from the strongest protection described in the specifications. (and
considered in this work)
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Due to an identity misbinding of the authentication vectors an attacker can execute a parallel
session attack.3 The vulnerability found could be exploited by both outside and inside attackers
in order to break authentication of a user to a serving network. Furthermore, inside attackers may
impersonate an honest user and use wireless services on his behalf without the user being present
on the network at that time. We reported the vulnerability to the 3GPP in Spring 2012 and have
since been waiting for any reply. In practice, UMTS AKA over MAP/MAPsec is flawed as the
session identifiers (called TCAP transaction identifier) are not protected. And the attack may
also be effective against both UMTS AKA and LTE AKA over intra-domain, depending on the
proprietary security solutions in place.
On the other hand, our analysis shows that UMTS and LTE AKA run over Diameter/IPsec
EPS and UMTS over MAP/TCAPsec are computationally secure: Under standard assumptions
on the cryptographic primitives, e.g., including IND-CPA secure symmetric encryption and WUF-
CMA secure integrity protection, and under the additional assumption that the session identifier
used in the carrying protocols (MAP or Diameter) are unique with overwhelming probability, we
use CryptoVerif to prove intended authentication properties and secrecy properties for the session
keys that are exchanged with the AKAs.
Related Work Annex B of the 3GPP technical report TR33.902 (2001) [1] documents a for-
mal analysis of the UMTS AKA protocol using a BAN logic variant, i.e., a symbolic and not
computational analysis. The analysis verifies authentication and secrecy properties under the as-
sumption that the home network acts as a trusted third party. The flaw that we present here is
not detected in [1] because strong assumptions (called prerequisites on SN’s side) are used which
already eliminate the weakness in the protocol and the network domain security.
The GSM Subscriber Identity Authentication protocol does not provide for the authentication
of the access network, which obviously creates a problem with detecting false base stations. The
interoperability of the GSM and UMTS systems perpetuates this attack possibility, reported in [50].
Our analysis is not directed to the problems of interoperability between LTE/UMTS/GSM.
[54] formally analyze the security UMTS and GSM roaming protocols using the tool ProVerif [22]
with respect to the symbolic security model. Again, they use strong assumptions on the core net-
work communication between serving networks and home networks (namely, they use private
channels), which cause them to overlook the vulnerability we discover.
A redirection attack on the UMTS AKA is reported in [55], which exploits the observation that
the user is not able to authenticate the identity of the serving network because this is not included
in the authentication vector provided by the home network. The new LTE AKA specification that
we analyze is designed to fix this weakness and implicitly authenticate the serving network to the
user.
A recent paper focuses on the unlinkability and anonymity properties of the protocol [14].
They also use the ProVerif tool for a symbolic analysis, and the paper describes an attack that
enables the adversary to distinguish a known user from any other. This is done by replaying
captured messages from the known user and use the different error messages that are returned.
The analysis models the UMTS AKA as a simplified two-party protocol between a user and the
core network. However, by reducing UMTS AKA to a two-party protocol, the weakness uncovered
in the present work is stamped out.
Our work is also relevant for RFC 4187 [39] that specifies an Extensible Authentication Protocol
Method for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA) based on UMTS
AKA, which is compatible with [38]. In particular, close attention needs to be paid in case the
communication between EAP authenticator and authentication server should be secured. We note
that the authors of [39] explicitly state that the IETF has not validated the security claims.
Structure of this work In Section 2, we will give an overview of the Mobile Network architecture
and give a description of the UMTS AKA and LTE AKA protocols. In Section 3, we describe the
3 We note that the attack is also relevant for the cases where the protocol messages of the GSM Subscriber
Identity Authentication [12,11] are meant to be protected within the core network (cf. Appendix B).
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vulnerability we found on both on the specifications of UMTS and LTE AKA and its consequences.
In Section 4, we present our computational security proofs of UMTS and LTE AKA using the tool
CryptoVerif. Finally, we conclude with Section 5.
2 The UMTS and LTE Authentication and Key Agreement Protocols
2.1 Overview of the Mobile Network Architecture
For both UMTS and LTE the basic network architectures are very similar. In comparison to
UMTS, the network elements used for LTE are upgraded and mostly renamed. However, they
fulfill the analogous tasks in both cases. In order to avoid unnecessary confusion over terminology,
we give a unified description of the network architectures of UMTS and LTE at the level of
detail necessary for understanding our analysis presented below. Basically, the mobile network
architecture comprises three parts, that is, the user’s mobile equipment U , the Radio Access
Network (RAN), and the Core Network (CN). The user equipment consists of the mobile equipment
and a tamper-resistant chip card, the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM). The USIM
is issued by a mobile operator to a subscriber and contains the International Mobile Subscriber
Identity (IMSI), the permanent key of the subscription shared between subscriber and operator,
and the cryptographic algorithms for the authentication protocol. In the following, we will use
the terms user, subscriber and user equipment interchangeably. Each mobile operator runs an
Authentication Center (AuC ) server within its core network that contains the security related
information of all the subscribers of the operator and generates temporary security credentials to
be used by a user and a core network to establish authentication guarantees and set up session
keys. The core network is divided into a serving network S and a home network H , where the latter
contains and maintains the AuC and the serving network is responsible for the communication to
the user equipment through the radio access network.
The serving network and the home network do not necessarily belong to the same security
domain, i.e., they may be controlled by different mobile operators. A subscriber U1 of a mobile
operator OP1 with home network H1 may roam into the domain of mobile operator OP2’s radio
access network maintained by serving network S2. If OP1 has a roaming agreement with OP2,
then U1 will be able to access the mobile network through S2’s radio access network. In this
case, the connections between S2 and H1 are called inter-domain connections. In comparison, the
connections within a core network controlled by a single mobile operator, i.e., between Si and Hi,
for i ∈ {1, 2}, are called intra-domain connections.
2.2 UMTS & LTE AKA
Figure 1 shows the message sequence diagram description of the authentication and key agreement
protocol in a unified way for UMTS and LTE on a similar level of detail as depicted in [4,9]. The
protocol is executed between user U , visited serving network S and U ’s home network H . U and
H share the long-term key K and a set of algorithms f1, . . . , f4 and, in the case of LTE, also a
key derivation function KDF . The functions f1, f2 are so called message authentication functions,
and f3, f4 are so called key generating functions
4. Moreover, U maintains a counter SQNU and
H a counter SQNH for U .
A protocol run starts with S sending a user id request and U responding with its IMSI 5. Next
follows the authentication data transfer, in which S sends an authentication data request to H ,
that consists of U ’s IMSI and S’s identifier SNid , and H answers with an authentication data
response. H chooses a fresh nonce RAND and computes, with the key K and its sequence number
SQNH , the so-called message authentication code MAC , the expected response XRES , the cipher
4 We choose to do without the anonymity key, i.e. f5 ≡ 0, which is an option in the specifications. We
also omit the AMF constant.
5 In fact, U may alternatively respond with a temporary mobile subscriber identity (TMSI), which
reduces but does not fully avoid the use of the IMSI .
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U
IMSI , K
S
SNid
H
{IMSIi,Ki}i
user id request
user id response
IMSI
auth data request
IMSI ,SNid
new nonce RAND
MAC ← f1,K (SQNH ‖RAND)
XRES ← f2,K (RAND)
CK ← f3,K (RAND)
IK ← f4,K (RAND)
AUTN ← SQNH ‖MAC
generate key Skey
auth data response
RAND ,AUTN ,XRES ,Skeyuser auth request
RAND ,AUTN
MAC
?
= f1,K (SQNH ‖RAND)
check(SQNU , SQNH )
RES ← f2,K (RAND)
compute key Skey
user auth response
RES
RES
?
= XRES
Fig. 1. The UMTS/LTE Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol. The session key in UMTS is Skey ←
CK ‖IK , and in LTE it is Skey := KASME ← KDF (SQNH ‖CK ‖IK ‖SNid).
key CK , the integrity key IK , and the authentication token AUTN as depicted in Figure 1, where
‖ denotes concatenation. The main difference between the UMTS AKA and LTE AKA is the
session key Skey . In LTE AKA, the session key is computed over the identifier of S. There is
the option that H sends S multiple authentication vectors (RAND i,AUTN i,XRES i, Skey i) for
i = 1, . . . , n at once in order to reduce the traffic between S and H .
In the user authentication request, S forwards only RAND and AUTN to U . From the received
RAND, AUTN , the user U extracts SQNH , computes the expected message authentication code
XMAC and compares it to MAC contained in AUTN . If they are equal then U performs a check
on the sequence numbers SQNH and SQNU
6. If either of this two checks fail, then U sends some
error messages to S (in fact, the error messages may be different, therefore allowing the linkability
attack of [14]). Otherwise U computes the response RES and sends it to S. User U can compute
the session key Skey from RAND and K. Finally, S compares the response received from U with
the expected response received from H ; if they are equal then the UMTS/LTE AKA run was
successfully completed.
Intuitively, the UMTS/LTE AKA establishes the session key Skey between U and S, therefore,
Skey must satisfy some secrecy property. Furthermore, the protocol aims to authenticate U to
S. Both properties require S to trust H to provide a correct authentication data response. The
sequence numbers allow to detect possible replays of authentication tokens. The UMTS/LTE AKA
protocol, as depicted in Figure 1, does not offer authentication of S to U . This known weakness
has been described in [55]. User U may at most know that H generated the received nonce and
authentication token for some service network.
Following the UMTS/LTE AKA, serving network S and user U need to negotiate the crypto-
graphic algorithms (security mode) used to protect subsequent wireless communication between
6 Checking and increasing the sequence numbers can be done in different ways
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S and U . Note that these algorithms are, in particular for inter-domain connections, not pre-
determined. The messages of this negotiation are protected by (keys derived from) Skey. This is
especially relevant for the case of LTE, where Skey is generated over S’s identifier SNid . In LTE,
by receiving the NAS security mode command directly following the user authentication response
of the AKA, U should be able to authenticate S, as this message constitutes a key confirmation
of the session key KASME . According to [9], the NAS security mode command sent from S to U
has following form:
S −→ U : eKSI ,UE security capabil ., ciph. algo, int . algo,NAS -MAC
where NAS-MAC is a message authentication code under a key derived from KASME over the rest
of the message, which consists of non-secret components7. We denote by LTE AKA+1 the LTE
AKA protocol together with this NAS security mode command message.
3 A Vulnerability in UMTS & LTE AKA
Here we present a weakness found in the authentication protocol specifications of both UMTS
and LTE AKA with the help of the tool CryptoVerif [23]. Although CryptoVerif has semantics
in the computational model, the flaw in the protocols is of symbolic nature. Unlike other provers
that work in the symbolic model, CryptoVerif does not output attack traces; instead we found
the attack by interpreting the last game in a sequence of game transformations performed by
CryptoVerif. It is the same flaw that is present in the specifications of both UMTS AKA and LTE
AKA. Although UMTS AKA has previously been formally analyzed [14,1], none of the previous
analyses have detected this flaw. How GSM SIA is affected by the flaw is discussed in Appendix B.
3.1 Communication Security Between S and H
As given in Figure 1, the communication in the core network, i.e., between S and H , is not
protected even though it can involve long-distance signalling, e.g., over IP networks. However it
is obvious that the communication between S and H should be protected in some way against a
network attacker, otherwise the exchanged session key(s) are sent in the clear. The specifications
of the security architectures of UMTS and LTE in [9] and [4], which specify the AKA protocols,
mention little about the security protection of the authentication data transfer. For instance,
the AKA protocols are given in [9] and [4] at essentially the same level of detail as in Figure 1.
However, for UMTS and LTE, the Network Domain Security (NDS) specifications detail the
protection of core network communication: [7,8] specify the protection of IP-based communication
between network elements. In addition, for UMTS, the communication between S and H can
also be carried out on the global SS7 network and its protection is then specified in [6,5]. In all
cases, the specifications distinguish between inter-domain communication, where communicating
parties are not controlled by the same mobile operator, and intra-domain communication, where
the communicating parties are controlled by the same mobile operator.
For inter-domain connections over IP-based networks, [7,8] mandate the protection of the com-
munication between network elements using IPsec with Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
mode. For inter-domain connections over SS7 networks, the specification [6] mandates the protec-
tion using Transaction Capabilities Application Part security (TCAPsec), which is the successor
for Mobile Application Part security (MAPsec) [5]. According to the specifications [5,6,7], IPsec
ESP, MAPsec and TCAPsec should all provide
– data integrity
– data origin authentication
– anti-replay protection
7 eKSI is the key identifier for KASME , UE security capabil are the security capabilities that UE had
sent to S before running the AKA, ciph. algo are the algorithms chosen by the serving network for
encryption, int. algo are the algorithms chosen by the serving network for integrity protection
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– confidentiality (optional)
For the case of IPsec ESP, [7] also lists as security guarantee
– limited protection against traffic flow analysis when confidentiality is applied.
For intra-domain connections over IP-based networks or SS7 networks, however, [7,8,6,5] state
that the protection of communication is regarded as an internal issue of each domain operator. In
particular, utilizing MAPsec, TCAPsec or IPsec ESP for intra-domain communication between S
and H is optional, even though the communication may involve long distance signaling. Instead it
is the decision of the operator what kind of protection of the core network communication he/she
wants in the network domain and which (proprietary) solutions he/she may deploy to achieve that
protection.
3.2 Session-mixup Attack against the Authentication Data Response
For our attacks on the UMTS and LTE AKA we consider, as usual, an adversary who is in full
control of the messages sent between instances of the roles of user U , serving network S, and
home network H . In particular, the adversary can control all incoming and outgoing messages of a
serving network S. We assume that the home network H acts as a trusted third party. We assume
that the messages sent between S and H are encrypted and then integrity protected through a
message authentication code under long-term keys shared between S and H(notice that support
for pre-shared keys is required in [5,6,7]), while not making any distinction between intra- or inter-
domain connections. The encrypt-then-mac scheme is indeed the principle used by IPsec, MAPsec,
and TACAPsec. Neglecting momentarily the details and differences of the carrying protocols, we
consider the scenario in which two user equipments U and U ′ are running concurrent sessions
with the same serving network S. Notice that when S sends an authentication data request to H
for authentication parameters of U , the authentication data response by H to S is bound to U
as it includes message components that are generated under the long-term key shared between H
and U . However, S cannot verify for which user equipment the received randomness and session
key were generated for, as S does not know the key shared between the user equipments and H .
We present two alternative scenarios in which an attacker may take advantage of this.
An Inside Attack In this scenario we consider an attacker A who is a subscriber U of H . The
message flow of this attack is depicted in Figure 2, where we omit the user identity request by S
(cf. Figure 1). Say U ′ is another subscriber of H who is honest. If A knows the IMSI ′ of U ′, which
A can learn either by listening on the network or by deploying a device called imsi catcher, then
A can execute the attack that is depicted in Figure 2 without U ′ even being present. In this case,
A does not need to be able to intercept messages sent over the base stations. The attacker sends
out two user identity responses: IMSI ′ and his own subscriber identity IMSI . Then S will run two
concurrent AKA sessions, one for U and one for U ′, and sends two authentication data requests
to H . When H sends the authentication data responses for S and U , then adversary A redirects
this message such that it is mistaken by S as the response by H for S and U ′ while he blocks the
authentication data response that H generated for S and U ′. Notice that this session mixup can
be created by the attacker without breaking any cryptographic primitive and does generally not
violate the specifications. Next the attacker redirects the messages sent by S intended for U ′ to
U . So U correctly receives the user authentication request containing message components that
were generated by H for U (and S). Therefore, attacker A, who is registered as U , can generate
the correct response and relay it to to S such that S believes that the response was generated
by U ′. The other session that S opened for U ′ is halted by A; it cannot be completed because A
does not know the keys that U ′ shares with H . Anyhow, A can impersonate U ′ to S, therefore,
breaking entity authentication. Furthermore, the attacker and S share a session key; it was in fact
generated by H for U and S. At the same time, S believes that this session key was generated by
H for S and U ′. Therefore, the attacker is able to execute subsequent communication steps and
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A
registered
as U
A
knowing
IMSI of U ′
A
S
start session
with U
start session
with U ′
finish session
with U
H
session for
U & S
session for
U ′ & S
stop
Fig. 2. Message flow of an inside attack against UMTS and LTE AKA (not showing the user id request).
The attacker impersonates honest user U ′ to S and shares the session key(s) with S, without U ′ being
involved.
use the derived keys to use the wireless service provided by S on behalf of U ′. 8 S will bill H for
the service that attacker A received on U ′ behalf, and H will bill U ′. Furthermore, an attacker
can falsely cause U ′ to appear physically present within a certain network cell
An Outside Attack In this attack scenario the attacker A does not need to be a subscriber
himself. The message flow of this attack is depicted in Figure 3, where we omit the user identity
request by S (cf. Figure 1). Assume that U and U ′ are subscribers of H and both execute an
AKA run with S at the same time. First adversary A correctly forwards the user identity response
message by U , respectively by U ′, to S and also forwards the authentication data requests by S
to H . At this point S has started two AKA sessions, one for U and one for U ′. When H sends
the authentication data responses for U and U ′, adversary A swaps these messages such that the
authentication data response for S and U is mistaken by S as the response by H for S and U ′, i.e.
it is accepted by S’s session for U ′. And A does the analogous with the response by H for S and
U ′. Again, this session mixup can be created by the attacker without breaking any cryptographic
primitive and does generally not violate the specifications. Next the attacker redirects the messages
sent by S intended for U ′ to U and vice versa. So U correctly receives the user authentication
request containing message components that were generated by H for U and S (and the analogous
holds for U ′). Therefore, under the assumption that the tests on the sequence numbers pass, U and
U ′ do not notice the attack and send out the correct user authentication responses to S. Finally,
A relays the response by U to S such that S believes that the message came from U ′, and does
analogous to the response by U ′.
Entity authentication of user equipment to S is clearly violated. At the end of the run, S
believes that it successfully completed a run with U while it was in fact U ′ that participated in
that run with S. Likewise, while S believes that it completed a run of the protocol with U ′, it was
in fact U who participated in that run with S. Furthermore, while S believes that it is sharing a
session key Skey with U , it is in fact sharing the session key Skey with U ′. Analogously, while S
8 The attack is not fended off by the use of TMSIs. And the attacker’s job is simplified in practice if
multiple authentication vectors are sent at once.
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UU ′
A
S
start session
with U
finish session
with U ′
start session
with U ′
finish session
with U
H
session for
U & S
session for
U ′ & S
Fig. 3. Example of a message flow of an outside attack against UMTS and LTE AKA (not showing the
user id request), where U is authenticated to S as U ′ and U ′ as U .
believes that it is sharing a session key Skey ′with U ′, it is in fact sharing the session key Skey ′
with U . Therefore, the attacker A may continue swapping the subsequent communication between
U and S and the one between U ′ and S, which are both protected by (keys derived from) the
exchanged session key. In the case that U and U ′ are not corrupted, the attacker cannot learn the
protected data that is transmitted (assuming the cryptographic primitives are sufficiently secure).
However, neither S or U or U ′ notices that U is authenticated to S as U ′ and U ′ as U .
As a consequence, U uses wireless service at the cost of U ′ and vice versa. Furthermore, an
attacker can falsely cause U and U ′ to appear physically present within certain network cells.
3.3 Feasibility of Real-World Attacks
In this section we consider the relevant details of the carrying protocols within the core network
and discuss the feasibility of the attack presented in the previous section. The AKA messages are
carried through the core network either by the Diameter protocol (for IP-based networks) or by the
MAP protocol (for SS7 networks). Both carrying protocols make use of session identifier that allow
network operators to match authentication data responses with the corresponding authentication
data requests. The session identifier are called Session-Id in the Diameter specifications [37] and
Transaction ID in the specifications of TCAP [41,42,43,44,45], which are referenced in the 3GPP
MAP specification [2]. TCAP is run underneath MAP and used to handle concurrent dialogues
for MAP.
The session-mixup attack of the previous section on the AKAs (with IPsec ESP, MAPsec
mode2 or TCAPsec mode2) is due to either a misbinding of the authentication data response
and the intended user equipment or a misbinding of the authentication data response and the
corresponding authentication data request. As session identifiers bind the authentication data
response and the corresponding request, the the use of such session identifiers in the carrying
protocols could prevent the session mixup attack if the used session identifiers are unique and
integrity protected.
In the following we consider the feasibility of the attack in the cases where the protection of
the core network communication follows the network domain security specifications [5,6,7]. We
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stress that network domain operators are free to implement proprietary protection mechanisms
for intra-domain connections.9
UMTS AKA over MAP and MAPsec When UMTS AKA is run over MAP and protected by
MAPsec [5] then the session identifiers, i.e., the TCAP transaction identifiers, are not protected
by MAPsec and can be manipulated by an attacker. Hence, the session mixup attacks should work
in practice. We note that we have not implemented the attacks yet.
UMTS AKA over MAP and TCAPsec When UMTS AKA is run over MAP and protected
by TCAPsec [6] then the TCAP transaction identifiers are integrity protected and can generally
not be manipulated by an attacker. However, the Transaction ID of TCAP, as specified in [43],
may not be unique. It can be a counter of variable length from one to four octets. In particular,
implementations of UMTS AKA over MAP with TCAP that use only one or two octet long
Transaction IDs may indeed be vulnerable to the session mixup attack in practice, as a wrap-
around of the Transaction ID counter could be forced by an attacker by starting a few thousand
sessions. The attacker can then execute the session mixup attack for sessions with equal session
identifiers. As the Transaction ID is a counter, the attacker may be able to predict which sessions
eventually use the same Transaction IDs. We note that we are not aware of any real world systems
that are vulnerable (due to too short session identifier). On the other hand, if the TCAP transaction
identifier is long enough such that a wrap-around may not be feasible, then the TCAP transaction
identifiers could be regarded as unique (in practice), and a session mixup would then not be feasible
as will be shown in Section 4.
UMTS and LTE AKA over Diameter and IPsec When UMTS and LTE AKA are run over
Diameter [37] and protected by IPsec EPS then the session identifiers are also integrity protected
and can generally not be manipulated by an attacker. In terms of practical security parameters, the
Session-ID of Diameter is specified in [37] to be a 64 bits long counter and is, therefore, practically
unique. Again, the security proofs in Section 4 suggest that a session mixup is not feasible.
With the use of unique session identifier and authenticated encryption within the core network,
the UMTS and LTE AKA protocols are more accurately described by Figure 4 than by Figure 1.
In particular, the serving network S in Figure 4 generates a fresh nonce SSID that is included in an
authentication data request. The nonce SSID serves as a unique session identifier and is expected to
be included in the corresponding authentication data response. Furthermore, the communication
between S and H is protected by authenticated encryption under a key that S and H share.
4 Mechanized Analysis of the UMTS & LTE AKA
In this section, we first give an overview of the tool CryptoVerif that we used to analyze the
AKA protocols and to find the flaw presented in Section 3. Then we discuss the cryptographic
assumptions and modeling decisions we made. And finally we present the results we obtained.
Notation. A function f : N −→ R≥0 is negligible, if for every positive polynomial p there exists
an integer N0 such that for all integers n > N0 it is f(n) < 1/p(n). A function g : N −→ R≥0 is
overwhelming if 1− g is a negligible function. Two sequences {Xη}η∈N and {Yη}η∈N are computa-
tionally indistinguishable if for every polynomial-time algorithm D, it holds that |Pr[D(Xn, 1
n) =
1]− Pr[D(Yn, 1
n) = 1]| is a negligible function in n.
9 We believe that intra-domain connections constitute the majority of connections made in the real world.
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IMSI , K
S
SNid
H
{IMSIi,Ki}i
user id request
user id response
IMSI
new nonce SSID auth data request
{SSID , IMSI ,SNid}Ksh
new nonce RAND
MAC ← f1,K (SQNH ‖RAND)
XRES ← f2,K (RAND)
CK ← f3,K (RAND)
IK ← f4,K (RAND)
AUTN ← SQNH ‖MAC
generate key Skey
auth data response
{SSID ,RAND ,AUTN ,
XRES ,Skey}Ksh
check SSID
user auth request
RAND ,AUTN
MAC
?
= f1,K (SQNH ‖RAND)
check(SQNU , SQNH )
RES ← f2,K (RAND)
compute key Skey
user auth response
RES
RES
?
= XRES
Fig. 4. The UMTS/LTE Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol with unique session IDs and au-
thenticated encryption in core network. The session key in UMTS is Skey ← CK ‖ IK , and in LTE it is
Skey := KASME ← KDF (SQNH ‖CK ‖IK ‖SNid). { .}Ksh denotes authenticated encryption.
4.1 CryptoVerif Basics
The prover CryptoVerif [25,23,24,27] can directly prove security properties of cryptographic pro-
tocols in the computational model. Protocols are formalized in CryptoVerif using a probabilistic
polynomial-time process calculus which is inspired by the pi-calculus and the calculi introduced
in [46] and [51]. In this calculus, terms have a computational semantics, i.e. messages are bitstrings
and cryptographic primitives are functions operating on bitstrings, where the lengths of bitstrings
are polynomial in a security parameter η.
When analyzing protocols, CryptoVerif follows the idea of [53], i.e. the process calculus repre-
sents games, and CryptoVerif proofs are sequences of such games Q0, Q1, . . . , Qn, where the initial
game Q0 formalizes the protocol for which one wants to prove certain security properties. In a
proof sequence, two consecutive games Qj and Qj+1 are observationally equivalent, meaning that
they are computationally indistinguishable for the adversary. CryptoVerif transforms one game
into another by applying, e.g. the security definition of a cryptographic primitive or by applying
syntactic transformations. For instance, if the protocol in game Q0 uses a symmetric encryption
scheme that is IND-CPA secure then CryptoVerif may transform game Qi to Qi+1 by essentially
replacing every occurrences of an encryption of a plaintext m under a non-corrupted key with
encryptions of bitstrings of zero of the same length as m. Therefore, all security definitions of
cryptographic primitives have to be formalized as pairs of indistinguishable oracles.
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In the last game in a proof sequence the desired security properties should be obvious, i.e.
CryptoVerif uses syntactic criteria to determine whether a security property is satisfied. Given a
security parameter η, CryptoVerif proofs are valid for a number of protocol sessions polynomial in
η, in the presence of an active adversary. For protocols, CryptoVerif can prove secrecy properties
and correspondence assertions, which can be used to formalize authentication properties.
CryptoVerif operates in two modes: a fully automatic and an interactive mode. The interactive
mode requires a CryptoVerif user to input commands that indicate the main game transformations
the tool should perform and the order in which they should be applied. CryptoVerif is sound with
respect to the security properties it shows in a proof, but properties it cannot prove are not
necessarily invalid. Occasionally, one needs to conclude a proof manually by inspecting the last
game that one obtained using either the fully automatic or the interactive mode of CryptoVerif.
A more detailed description of CryptoVerif and its process calculus is given in [25].
CryptoVerif Language In CryptoVerif, a term M that represent computations on bitstrings
can be constructed according to the following grammar:
M ::= term
i replication index
x[M1, . . . ,Mm] variable access
f(M1, . . . ,Mm) function application,
where replication index i is used to distinguish several copies of a replicated process , and the
variable access x[M1, . . . ,Mm] returns the value of x for the indices M1, . . . ,Mm.
There are two kinds of processes in the calculus: input processes and output processes. These
can be generated according to the grammar depicted in Figure 5.
Q ::= input process
0 nil
Q | Q′ parallel composition
!i≤NQ replication N times
newChannel c;Q channel restriction
c[M1, . . . ,Ml](x1 [˜i] : T1, . . . , xk [˜i] : Tk);P input
P ::= output process
c[M1, . . . ,Ml]〈M
′
1, . . . ,M
′
k〉;Q output
new x[i1, . . . , im] : T ;P random number
let x[i1, . . . , im] : T = M in P assignment
if defined(M1, . . . ,Ml) ∧M then P else P
′ conditional
find (
⊕m
j=1
uj1 [˜i] ≤ nj1, . . . , ujmj [˜i] ≤ njmj
suchthat defined(Mj1, . . . ,Mjlj ) ∧Mj then Pj)
else P ′ array lookup
event e(M1, . . . ,Mm);P event,
Fig. 5. Syntax of CryptoVerif’s process calculus
The nil process does nothing, Q | Q′ represents parallel execution of Q and Q′, the process
!i≤NQ represents parallel execution of N copies of Q, which are indexed by i, and newChannel c;Q
creates a new private channel and executes Q. When process c[M1, . . . ,Ml]〈N1, . . . , Nk〉;Q, e.g.
representing a message being sent over the network, is executed then an input c[M ′1, . . . ,M
′
l ](x1 [˜i] :
T1, . . . , xk [˜i] : Tk);P (where T represents types used in the calculus) is searched that is ready
to receive the sent message, i.e. the instantiations of the M ′i should be equal to the bitstring
representation of the Mi – if none exists then the process is blocked, if there are several then
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one is chosen at uniform random, and then for j = 1, . . . , k, each Nj is essentially stored in
xj [i]. Afterwards P is executed and input process Q becomes one of the available input pro-
cesses. The process new x[i1, . . . , im] : T ;P chooses uniformly at random a number in the set of
bitstrings corresponding to T (e.g. a set of random seeds needed for probabilistic encryption),
let x[i1, . . . , im] : T = M in P stores the bitstring instantiation of M , which must be of type
T , in x[i1, . . . , im] and proceeds with P . The process if defined(M1, . . . ,Ml) ∧M then P else P
′
executes P if M1, . . . ,Ml have been defined and the interpretation of M (e.g., an equality test
on bitstrings) holds, otherwise it executes P ′. The process find (
⊕m
j=1 uj1 [˜i] ≤ nj1, . . . , ujmj [˜i] ≤
njmj suchthat defined(Mj1, . . . ,Mjlj ) ∧ Mj then Pj) else P
′, where i˜ is a tuple i1, . . . , im′ , tries
to find a branch of the execution indexed by 1 ≤ j ≤ m such that there exist indices uj1 [˜i] ≤
nj1, . . . , ujmj [˜i] ≤ njlj for whichMj1, . . . ,Mjlj have been defined and the computational interpre-
tation of Mj holds, and in that case the process continues by executing Pj , otherwise it executes
P ′. The process event e(M1, . . . ,Mm);P executes the event e(M1, . . . ,Mm), then executes P . Ex-
ecuting an event does not change the state of the system, but events are used in the specification
of authentication properties.
As an example, we formalize in CryptoVerif the process of the user equipment in the case of
LTE AKA. Additional formalizations of processes for LTE AKA and LTE AKA+1 can be found
in the Appendix A. Note that we do not model the first message by the serving network in Figure
QU = !
iU≤NU c1[iU ](hostS : sn);
c2[iU ]〈U, hostS 〉;
c11[iC ](RAND
′′ : nonce ,= SQN ,MAC ′′ : prpcblocksize);
let MAC ′′′ = prpcenc(concat8(const1,SQN ,RAND), prpKuh) in
if MAC ′′′ = MAC ′′ then
let RES ′′ = prpcenc(concat9(const2,RAND), prpKuh) in
let CK ′′ = prpcenc(concat9(const3,RAND), prpKuh) in
let IK ′′ = prpcenc(concat9(const4,RAND), prpKuh) in
let K′′ASME = prf(prfKuh, concat3(SQN ,CK
′′, IK ′′, hostS ))
event partAuthU (RAND ′′,RES ′′);
c12[iU ]〈RES
′′〉;
cfinish [iU ]();
if hostS = S then
(
event endAuthU 2(hostS ,RAND ′′,K′′ASME );
let keyU : mkeyseed = K′′ASME
)
else cend1 [iU ]〈K
′′
ASME 〉.
Fig. 6. CryptoVerif formalization of user equipment actions in LTE AKA
1, i.e. the user id request. First process QU obtains the name of the S to interact in an AKA run
with, then QU sends his own name (representing his IMSI) and the name S of a serving network
out. When QU receives a nonce RAND
′′, the sequence number SQN equal to his own, and MAC ′′
that is of type prpcblocksize , i.e. in the range of the PRP block cipher prpcenc (see Section 4.2
for the cryptographic assumptions made), then QU re-computes and checks the MAC
′′ using the
long-term key prpKuh shared with trusted third party H and a public constant const1. Afterwards
QU computes RES
′′, CK ′′ and IK ′′, where QU uses the same key prpKuh but different constants
const2, const3, const4. The patterns concat8 and concat9 are used to wrap messages of different
formats so that they can be taken as the first argument of the PRP encryption function. Then QU
computes the session key K ′′ASME with a pseudorandom function and a key for that purpose that
it shares with H . Before QU sends out RES
′′, it records some of the messages seen in this run in
the event partAuthU , which should then correspond to messages recorded in events of the process
for honest S in order to obtain authentication guarantees. Finally, if QU indeed communicated
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with S then records the name S in the event endAuthU2 and stores K ′′ASME in keyU , but if hostS
was not honest S (but the adversary) then QU simply publishes the key.
Authentication and Secrecy using CryptoVerif Authentication in CryptoVerif is modeled by
correspondence properties [24]. Events e(M1, . . . ,Mm) are used in order to record that a certain
program point has been reached, with certain values of M1, . . . ,Mm, and the correspondence
properties are properties of the form “if some event has been executed, then some other events
also have been executed, with overwhelming probability”.
A process Q satisfies the correspondence event(e(M1, . . . ,Mm))⇒
∧k
i=1 event(ei(Mi1, . . . ,
Mimi)) if and only if, with overwhelming probability, for all values of the variables in
M1, . . . ,Mm, if the event e(M1, . . . ,Mm) has been executed, then the events ei(Mi1, . . . ,
Mimi) for i ≤ k have also been executed for some values of the variables of Mij (i ≤ k,
j ≤ mi) not in M1, . . . ,Mm.
Note that CryptoVerif can also show stronger, injective correspondence, where for event(e(M1,
. . . ,Mm)) ⇒
∧k
i=1 event(ei(Mi1, . . . ,Mimi)) the executions of the events ei(Mi1, . . . ,Mimi) are
distinct. However, we are not interested in injective correspondences for UMTS and LTE AKA, as
they simply do not hold given our modeling of the protocol where there is little replay protection.
The formal definitions of correspondences in CryptoVerif can be found in [24].
A variable is considered secret when the adversary has no information on it, that is, the
adversary cannot distinguish it from a random number.
A process Q preserves the one-session secrecy of x when, with overwhelming probability,
the adversary interacting with Q cannot distinguish any element of the array x from a
uniformly distributed random number by a single test query. The test query returns either
the desired element of x or a freshly generated random number, and the adversary has to
distinguish between these two situations.
Note that this notion of secrecy corresponds to the standard notion of key indistinguishability;
but it does not guarantee that the random numbers in x are independent. CryptoVerif can show
a stronger notion of secrecy, in which the adversary can perform several test queries, and which
therefore corresponds to the “real-or-random” definition of security [13]. However, this stronger
notion is not satisfied by UMTS and LTE AKA the way we model them. In particular, as replays
are not immediately rejected by the protocols in our model, an adversary can force several protocol
sessions to agree on the same key; if the adversary is allowed to perform several test queries then
he can distinguish a challenge key with overwhelming probability. The formal definitions of secrecy
in CryptoVerif can be found in [25].
4.2 Cryptographic Assumptions
As CryptoVerif operates with computational semantics, we need to specify the assumptions we
make for the cryptographic primitives used in UMTS and LTE AKA. The algorithms for f1, . . . , f4
(see Figure 1) are not mandated by the 3GPP’s specifications, but can be chosen freely by the
home network operator. Indeed f1, . . . , f4 are only needed in the USIM of the user equipment,
and in the AuC server in the home network but are not used by the serving network S. These
functions are rather vaguely described in [9]: f1 and f2 are ’message authentication functions’
and f3, f4, f5 are ’key generating functions’. However, 3GPP specifies the sample algorithms set
MILENAGE [10]. Motivated by MILENAGE, we assume that the f1, . . . , f4 are all based on a
single pseudo-random permutation block cipher10. Notice that we assume that no anonymity key
is used, i.e. f5 ≡ 0, which is an option in [9,4]. As in MILENAGE, all fi in the same run will use
10 in CryptoVerif the PRP block cipher is actually modeled rather like a PRF; this is justified by the
PRF/PRP switching lemma, e.g. [20]
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the same long-term key (shared between U and H) in our model but each fi also takes as input a
constant ci. We further assume that each S shares with H a long-term symmetric encryption key
and a long-term message authentication key; which corresponds to the requirement that IPsec and
MAPsec must support pre-shared keys and also to our assumption that IPsec and MAPsec security
associations are static. Moreover, we assume that these keys are used to protect the connection
between a S andH through an encrypt-then-mac scheme, where the encryption is IND-CPA secure
and the message authentication code is WUF-CMA secure (this implies INT-PTXT [19]). There
is no ordering on terms by size and no arithmetics in CryptoVerif, so we cannot implement any
checks on the sequence number SQN as intended by AKA; in our model the sequence number is
a constant and the user only checks for equality. In particular, that means that the protocol in
our model lacks replay-attack protection. In addition, in the case of LTE AKA, we assume that
the key derivation function is a pseudo-random function which outputs a key seed to generate a
message authentication key. This key seed is then used to generate the session key KASME . This
way of indirectly generating KASME is due to the fact that in cryptography, security definitions
for a message authentication code (but also for encryption schemes etc.) only hold for keys that
are created by the accompanying key generation algorithm. All cryptographic primitives that we
use are already modeled and ready-to-use in CryptoVerif.
4.3 Results
In this section, we present results that we have obtained with CryptoVerif (version 1.16) when
analyzing the UMTS and LTE AKA as depicted in Figure 4 under the cryptographic assumption
stated in Section 4.2. In all the results below we assume that the home network H is a trusted
third party which always acts honestly. Excerpts of the CryptoVerif scripts used for the analysis
of LTE AKA and LTE AKA+1 (as defined in Section 2.2) are given by Figure 6 and by Figures 7
– 13, which can be found in the appendix A. The corresponding input scripts for UMTS AKA are
easily derivable from the presented scripts for LTE AKA; the main difference lies in the session
key (cf. Figure 1), i.e. for UMTS AKA, the process for H does not generate KASME and instead
of KASME the pair of keys (CK , IK ) is used in the sent messages and events.
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Results for UMTS AKA For UMTS we can prove the following.
Theorem 1 (Authentication of core network to User Equipment). In the UMTS AKA,
if there is an instance of
– an honest user U receiving a value RAND ′′ as nonce in a user authentication request and
generates with it and the key shared with home network H a response RES ′′
then, with overwhelming probability, there is an instance of
– the home network H completing a run of the UMTS AKA for serving network S and user U
– in which H generated a nonce RAND and an expected response XRES, where RAND equals
RAND ′′ and XRES equals RES ′′.
Intuitively, this theorem implies that if a users completes a run of the UMTS AKA protocol then
the users can be certain that the received nonce was generated by the trusted home network
(although this does not give the user any guarantee that the serving network it communicates
with is acting honestly).
Theorem 2 (Entity Authentication of User Equipment to Serving Network). In the
UMTS AKA, if there is an instance of
– an honest serving network S completing a run of the UMTS AKA with honest user equipment
U and home network H
11 Please contact the authors of this work directly to obtain the full CryptoVerif input scripts for UMTS
AKA, LTE AKA or LTE AKA+1.
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– in which S received a value RAND ′ as nonce and a value XRES ′ as expected response from
H in a authentication data response
– and in which S received a value RES ′ that equals XRES ′ in a user authentication response
then, with overwhelming probability, there is an instance of
– H completing a data authentication transfer with S
– in which H generated a nonce RAND and an expected response XRES for the use between S
and U , where RAND ′ equals RAND and XRES ′ equals XRES
and an instance of
– U completing a run of the UMTS AKA
– in which U received a value RAND ′′ as nonce that is equal to RAND ′
– and in which U sent a response RES ′′ that equals XRES ′.
Intuitively, this theorem implies that if serving network S completes a run of UMTS AKA for
user U then U must indeed have been involved in a run of the UMTS AKA in which it generated
matching values.
Theorem 3 (Key Secrecy in UMTS AKA). Let QUMTS be the game in CryptoVerifs process
calculus formalizing the UMTS AKA. Furthermore, let keyS1 and keyS2 denote in QUMTS the
confidentiality key CK and, respectively, the integrity key IK that are received by an honest serving
network from the home network and generated by the home network for the use between the serving
network and an honest user. Then QUMTS preserve the one-session secrecy of keyS1 and keyS2.
This theorem states that the exchanged keys CK , IK that an honest serving network S holds after
completing a UMTS AKA run with honest user U are cryptographically secret (in the sense of
1-session secrecy). It is already known that UMTS AKA does not offer entity authentication of
a serving network S to user equipment U (which, e.g., allows an attacker to set up false base
stations; see [55]). Therefore, with respect to secrecy of exchanged session keys, we can only hope
for showing that the key that S holds at the end of a session with an honest U is secure. The
process of user U cannot distinguish cases where it agreed on a session key with honest serving
network S from cases where the session key is agreed on with a dishonest serving network S′.
Therefore U ’s session key is not secret.
Proof (for Theorems 1, 2 & 3). In the CryptoVerif process formalizing the UMTS AKA, when the
process for honest S completes a run of the AKA protocol it executes an event endAuthS(h,RAND ′,
XRES ′) that contains the name h of the user equipment that supposedly participated in the pro-
tocol run, and a nonce RAND ′ and an expected response XRES ′ that were protected under a
encrypt-then-mac scheme with key that is shared with H . The event is executed after S received
a response that equals XRES ′. When the process for H completes a run of the authentication
data transfer it executes an event endAuthH (h2, h1,RAND,XRES) that contains the name of
a registered serving network h1 from whom it received a request, the name h2 of a registered
user equipment U , a random nonce RAND generated by H , and an expected response XRES
generated by H using a key shared between H and h2. Furthermore, it executes an event event
endAuthHU (h2,RAND,XRES ). When the process for honest U completes a run of the AKA pro-
tocol then it executes an event partAuthU (RAND ′′,RES ′′) that contains a nonce RAND ′′ that
U received together with a valid MAC produced with a key kuh shared between U and H , and
that contains a response RES ′′ generated by U over RAND ′′ using the key kuh. We can show with
CryptoVerif the correspondence queries
event partAuthU (x, y) ⇒ event endAuthHU (U, x, y)
event endAuthS(U, x, y) ⇒ event endAuthH (U, S, x, y)
event endAuthS(U, x, y) ⇒ event partAuthU (x, y).
The first of these queries captures the statement of Theorem 1.
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With respect to key secrecy: In QUMTS , when the process for the honest serving network
completes a run in the UMTS AKA with H and an honest user U , then it stores the session keys
received from H in keyS1 and keyS2, respectively. CryptoVerif can prove the one-session secrecy
queries secret1 keyS1 and secret1 keyS2 automatically.
The proof for Theorems 1, 2 & 3 takes 44 game transformations for CryptoVerif using the
commands
1. auto
2. SArename RAND 255;
3. SArename @22 r2 272;
4. SArename @22 r2 270;
5. move array @22 r2 493;
6. success.
⊓⊔
Results for LTE AKA For LTE AKA we can prove the following.
Theorem 4 (Authentication of core network to User Equipment). In the LTE AKA, if
there is an instance of
– an honest user U receiving a value RAND ′′ as nonce in a user authentication request and
generates with it and the key shared with home network H a response RES ′′
then, with overwhelming probability, there is an instance of
– the home network H completing a run of the LTE AKA for serving network S and user U
– in which H generated a nonce RAND and an expected response XRES, where RAND equals
RAND ′′ and XRES equals RES ′′.
Again, as for UMTS AKA, the LTE AKA itself does not offer authentication of the serving network
to the user, but we can only show that a serving network that a user equipment communicates
with has been authorized by the home network.
Theorem 5 (Entity Authentication of User Equipment to Serving Network). In the
LTE AKA, if there is an instance of
– an honest serving network S completing a run of the LTE AKA with honest user equipment
U and home network H
– in which S received a value RAND ′ as nonce and a value XRES ′ as expected response from
H in a authentication data response
– and in which S received a value RES ′ as response in a user authentication response that equals
XRES ′
then, with overwhelming probability, there is an instance of
– H completing a data authentication transfer with S
– in which H generated a nonce RAND and an expected response XRES for the use between S
and U , where RAND ′ equals RAND and XRES ′ equals XRES
and an instance of
– U completing a run of the LTE AKA
– in which U received a value RAND ′′ as nonce in an user authentication request that is equal
to RAND ′
– and in which U sent a response RES ′′ that equals XRES ′.
As for UMTS AKA, the LTE AKA itself does not offer authentication of the serving network
to the user, therefore we cannot show key secrecy for the session key held by the honest user. But
we can again show secrecy for the session key of the serving network.
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Theorem 6 (Key Secrecy in LTE AKA). Let QLTE be the game in CryptoVerifs process
calculus formalizing the LTE AKA. Furthermore, let keyS denote in QLTE the session key KASME
received by an honest serving network from the home network and generated by the home network
for the use between the serving network and an honest user. Then QLTE preserve the one-session
secrecy of keyS.
Proof (for Theorems 4, 5 & 6). The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorems 1, 2 & 3, using
the commands
1. auto
2. SArename RAND 275;
3. SArename @22 r2 292;
4. SArename @22 r2 290;
5. move array @22 r2 2150;
6. success.
CryptoVerif needs 57 transformations. ⊓⊔
Unlike UMTS AKA, the LTE is designed to offer also authentication of S to U . For this reason
the session key KASME is generated using S’s identity. Nevertheless, the authentication guarantee
is not explicitly established in LTE AKA itself but should hold after the next message sent by S
to U , i.e. the first message of the exchange called NAS Security Mode Command Procedure (NAS
SMC) in [9]. This exchange uses KASME
12 as key for a message authentication code. Recall from
Section 2.2, that we denote the LTE AKA with the additional first message of the NAS SMC by
LTE AKA+1. For LTE AKA+1, we can show, in addition to Theorem 4 and 5, the following.
Theorem 7 (Entity Authentication of Serving Network to user equipment). In the LTE
AKA+1, if there is an instance of
– an honest user equipment U completing a run of the LTE AKA+1 with honest serving network
S and home network H
– in which U received a value RAND ′′ as nonce in an user authentication request and derived a
key seed K ′′ASME
– and in which U verified a valid message authentication code on a received message using the
key generated from K ′′ASME
then, with overwhelming probability, there is an instance of
– H completing a data authentication transfer with S
– in which H generated a nonce RAND and derived a key seed KASME for the use between S
and U , where RAND ′′ equals RAND and K ′′ASME equals KASME
and an instance of
– S completing a run of the LTE AKA+1
– in which S received a value RAND ′ as nonce from H that is equal to RAND ′′ and derived a
key seed K ′ASME that equals K
′′
ASME
– and in which S sent out a NAS security mode command message with a message authentication
code under the key generated from K ′ASME .
Proof (of Theorem 7). In the CryptoVerif process that formalizes the LTE AKA+1, when the
process for honest user equipment U completes a run of the AKA+1 protocol, it executes an
event endAuthU1(hostS ,RAND ′′,K ′′ASME ) that contains the name hostS of the serving network
that supposedly participated in the same run, a nonce RAND ′′ that U received together with a
valid MAC produced with a key kuh shared between U and H , and a mac key seed K
′′
ASME that
U derived from inputs including RAND ′′, the name hostS and a key shared between U and H .
12 in our model a key generated from KASME
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When the process for H completes a run of the authentication data transfer it executes an event
endAuthH1 (h2, h1,RAND,KASME ) that contains the name of a registered serving network h1
from whom it received a request, the name h2 of a registered user equipment U , a random nonce
RAND generated by H , and a key seed KASME derived by H from inputs including RAND , the
name h1 and a key shared between H and h2. We can show with CryptoVerif the correspondence
queries
event endAuthU1 (S, x, y) ⇒ event endAuthS1(U, x, y)
event endAuthU1 (S, x, y) ⇒ event endAuthH1(U, S, x, y).
We can show the queries with CryptooVerif automatically in 60 game transformations. ⊓⊔
Remark 1. Although LTE AKA+1 satisfies authentication of S to U , the session key that U holds
at the end of a completed session is still not computationally secret. The reason in this case is the
following: (a key derived from) this session key is used during the session for generating a message
authentication code. This allows an attacker to distinguish the key easily. Given a challenge key,
the attacker just tries to verify this message authentication code with the challenge key. If the
verification is successful, then the attacker guesses that the challenge key equals the session key, else
the challenge key must be random key. Thus, the attacker has a overwhelming success probability
in distinguishing U ’s session key. Moreover, for the same reason any session key that honest serving
network S holds at the end of a completed run does also not satisfy one-session secrecy, i.e. the
result from Theorem 6 does not hold for LTE AKA+1.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
We present the first computational security analysis of the Authentication and Key Agreement
of UMTS and LTE, where we consider entity authentication and key secrecy properties while
taking into account the carrying protocols within the core network. The analysis uncovers a flaw
in the specifications of UMTS and LTE AKA and the network domain security with rather serious
consequences. An outside attacker can defeat entity authentication of the user equipments to the
serving networks. And an inside attacker can authenticate as another honest subscriber to a serving
network and use the wireless services on his behalf. Previous published analyses of UMTS AKA
were working in a purely symbolic model and did not catch the attacks because they generally
made too strong assumptions on the connection between serving network and home network.
The attacks can be prevented if the carrying protocols use unique integrity-protected session
identifiers in the communication between serving and home network. In practice, UMTS AKA is
vulnerable if it is run over MAP and MAPsec, as the session identifiers are not integrity-protected,
while UMTS and LTE AKA run over the Diameter protocol and IPsec are secure. We use the tool
CryptoVerif to verify entity authentication properties and key secrecy properties with respect to
the computational model for the UMTS and LTE AKA protocols when unique session IDs and
authenticated encryption in the core network are used.
We question whether it is prudent practice to make the security of the UMTS/LTE AKA
protocol (or, in fact, any other cryptographic protocol) reliant on the carrying protocols and their
protection without considering the security of the combined protocol. Instead we believe that it
would be much more desirable to directly consider the combination of AKA with carrying protocol
and its protection. The UMTS/LTE AKA protocols should ideally be strengthened by making the
binding of H ’s authentication data response for an intended U explicit in the AKA specifications
and by explicitly requiring that authenticated encryption is used to protect the connection between
serving and home network. Moreover, the specifications [4] and [9] of UMTS/LTE AKA need to
be revised so that the desired security properties on all connections are explicitly stated. This is
also important for intra-domain connections, where operators are free to implement proprietary
solutions and may currently miss to implement or sufficiently protect mechnisms for the serving
network to correctly match the authentication data responses, even if their implementation is
guided by the specifications of the security architecture [4,9].
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We are interested in further exploring to what extend real-world systems are vulnerable to
our attack, which, e.g., also depends on how widely MAPsec or TCAPsec with short transaction
identifiers are deployed in practice. We would also like to expand our analysis to scenarios of the
protocol execution that are not covered in the present work, e.g. the scenarios that are related
to the use of TMSIs, and include the usage of the sequence number in order to verify stronger
authentication properties than entity authentication. Moreover, it would be interesting to verify
under which conditions the specified MILENAGE algorithms and the key derivation algorithm
satisfy the computational assumptions made in this work.
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A LTE AKA in CryptoVerif
We present, in Figures 7 – 13, additional parts of the input scripts to CryptoVerif used in our
analysis of LTE AKA and LTE AKA+1, which we believe are sufficient to understand the modeling
of the protocol and the explanations of the proofs in this paper. Please see the CryptoVerif manual,
which ships with the tool downloadable at http://www.cryptoverif.ens.fr/, for further detail
on the syntax of the input language.
Notation ue, sn and hn denote the types of, respectively, user equipments, serving networks
and home networks. mkeyseed, mkey and macs denote the types of, respectively, inputs to the
key generator, keys, and outputs of the message authentication code (which is used for protection
of the communication between serving network and home network). Similarly, keyseed, key and
seed denote the types of, respectively, inputs to the key generator, keys and random seeds used by
the probabilistic encryption scheme (which ist used for protection of the communication between
serving network and home network); the cleartexts and ciphertexts of the encryption scheme
are of type bitstring. prfkeyseed, prfkey and prft denote the types of, respectively, inputs to the
key generator, keys and outputs of the pseudo-random function (which is used as key derivation
function). prpckeyseed, prpckey and prpcblocksize denote the types of, respectively, inputs to the
key generator, keys and outputs of the pseudo-random permutation block cipher (which is used
for the functions f1, . . . , f4). And econst denotes the type of constants that are used as input to
the prp block cipher in order to distinguish its usage as f1, . . . , or f4.
kgen, enc and dec comprise the encryption scheme used to protect messages between serving
network and home network. i⊥ is the natural injection from the set of cleartexts to bitstring ∪ ⊥
(needed as decryption may fail). The patterns concatj for j ∈ {1, . . . , 9} are used to wrap messages
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of different formats so that they can be taken as input of a function, e.g. the encryption func-
tion. mkgen, mac and check comprise the message authentication code used to protect messages
between serving network and home network. prpcenc and prpckgen denote the pseudo-random
permutation block cipher and its key generation function used to model the functions f1, . . . , f4.
prf and prfkgen denote the pseudo-random function and its key generation function used to model
the key derivation function.
Otherwise the scripts follow the syntax as presented in Figure 5. Please contemplate the full
input scripts and CryptoVerif’s manual for the exact type declarations and exact function dec-
laration/expansion. The main process is given in Figure 13, which is equal for LTE AKA and
LTE AKA+1 up to the different sub processes for user equipment and serving network. Before
executing the processes for user equipment, serving network and home network in parallel, the
main process first generates values, e.g. key material, on which the adversary has a priori no
information. The two processes presented in Figures 10 and 11 allow the adversary to register
with the home network as, respectively, serving network or user equipment (as needed for inside
attacks). They are used by the home network H to look up long-term keys shared between H and
a serving network or a user equipment.
QS = !
iS≤NS c3[iS ](h : ue, hostS
′ : sn);
if hostS ′ = S then
new r1 : seed ;
let e1 = enc(concat2(h, S),Ksh , r1 ) in
c4[iS ]〈S, e1,mac(e1,mKsh)〉;
c9[iS ](e
′
4 : bitstring ,mac
′
4 : macs);
if check(e′4,mKsh,mac
′
4) then
let i⊥(concat7(= h,K
′
ASME ,RAND
′,XRES ′,SQN ′,MAC ′)) = dec(e′4,Ksh) in
c10[iS ]〈RAND
′,SQN ′,MAC ′〉;
c13[iS ](RES
′ : prpcblocksize);
if XRES ′ = RES ′ then
event endAuthS (h,RAND ′,RES ′);
if h = U then
(
let keyS : mkeyseed = K′ASME
)
else cend2 [iS ]〈K
′
ASME 〉.
Fig. 7. CryptoVerif formalization of serving network (eNB/MME) actions in LTE AKA
B GSM Authentication Protocol
The GSM Subscriber Identity Authentication protocol is depicted in Figure 14 and can be regarded
as the 2G predecessor of the UMTS AKA protocol. When the home network H receives a security
information request for U , then H looks up the individual subscriber authentication key K0 that it
shares with U and generates the authentication vector response by generating a randomRAND and
by computing the signed response SRES . The authentication algorithm A3 and the ciphering key
generating algorithm A8 fulfill similar tasks as, respectively, f2 and f3/f4/KDF for UMTS/LTE
AKA.
The GSM SIA is specified in [12,11] and depicted in Figure 14 in Appendix B. This protocol
suffers from the same underspecification as UMTS and LTE AKA: there is no proper binding of
the response from the home network (called Authentication Vector Response) to the corresponding
request or user. Therefore, both attacks of Figures 3 and 2 could also be deployed against GSM
SIA. However, the case of GSM SIA is different from the case UMTS/LTE AKA. In the GSM
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Q+U = !
iU≤NU c1[iU ](hostS : sn);
c2[iU ]〈U, hostS 〉;
c11[iC ](RAND
′′ : nonce ,= SQN ,MAC ′′ : blocksize);
let MAC ′′′ = prpcenc(concat1(const1,SQN ,RAND), prpKuh) in
if MAC ′′′ = MAC ′′ then
let RES ′′ = prpcenc(concat2(const2,RAND), prpKuh) in
let CK ′′ = prpcenc(concat2(const3,RAND), prpKuh) in
let IK ′′ = prpcenc(concat2(const4,RAND), prpKuh) in
let K′′ASME = prf(prfKuh, concat3(SQN ,CK
′′, IK ′′, hostS ))
event partAuthU (RAND ′′,RES ′′);
c12[iU ]〈RES
′′〉;
c15[iU ](= NASsma ,mac6 : macs);
let mKNAS ′′ = mkgen(K′′ASME ) in
if check(NASsma,mKNAS ′′,mac6) then
if hostS = S then
event endAuthU 1(hostS ,RAND ′′,K′′ASME ).
Fig. 8. CryptoVerif formalization of user equipment actions in LTE AKA+1, where NASsma is considered
to be a non-secret constant
Q+S = !
iS≤NS c3[iS ](h : ue, hostS
′ : sn);
if hostS ′ = S then
new r1 : seed ;
let e1 = enc(concat2(h, S),Ksh , r1 ) in
c4[iS ]〈S, e1,mac(e1,mKsh)〉;
c9[iS ](e
′
4 : bitstring ,mac
′
4 : macs);
if check(e′4,mKsh,mac
′
4) then
let i⊥(concat7(= h,K
′
ASME ,RAND
′,XRES ′,SQN ′,MAC ′)) = dec(e′4,Ksh) in
c10[iS ]〈RAND
′,SQN ′,MAC ′〉;
c13[iS ](RES
′ : prpcblocksize);
if XRES ′ = RES ′ then
let mKNAS ′ = mkgen(K′ASME ) in
event (endAuthS1 (h,RAND ′,K′ASME ).
c14[iS ]〈NASsma,mac(NASsma,mKNAS
′)〉.
Fig. 9. CryptoVerif formalization of serving network (eNB/MME) actions in LTE AKA+1, where NASsma
is considered to be a non-secret constant
QK = !
iK≤N2 c6[iK ](Khost : sn,Kkey : key ,Kmkey : mkey);
letRkey : key =
if Khost = S thenKsh else
Kkey
in
let Rmkey : mkey =
if Khost = S then mKsh else
Kmkey .
Fig. 10. CryptoVerif formalization of the process for registering long-term keys shared between honest
home network and possibly dishonest serving networks in LTE AKA and LTE AKA+1
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QL = !
iL≤N2 c7[iL](Lhost : ue ,Lkey : prpckey ,Lprfkey : prfkey);
letUkey : prpckey =
if Lhost = U thenprpckuh else
Lkey
in
let Uprfkey : prfkey =
if Lhost = U then prfKuh else
Lprfkey .
Fig. 11. CryptoVerif formalization of the process for registering long-term keys shared between honest
home network and possibly dishonest user equipments in LTE AKA and LTE AKA+1
QH = !
iS≤NH c5[iH ](h1 : sn, e
′
1 : bitstring ,mac
′
1 : macs);
find j1 ≤ N2 suchthat defined(Khost [j1],Rmkey [j1],Rkey [j1]) ∧ (Khost [j1] = h1) then
if check(e′1,Rmkey [j1],mac
′
1) then
let i⊥(concat2(h2,= h1)) = dec(e
′
1,Rkey [j1]) in
find j2 ≤ N2 suchthat defined(Lhost [j2],Ukey [j2],Uprfkey [j2]) ∧ (Lhost [j2] = h2) then
new RAND : nonce ;
let MAC = prpcenc(concat8(const1,SQN ,RAND),Ukey [j2]) in
let XRES = prpcenc(concat9(const2,RAND),Ukey [j2]) in
let CK = prpcenc(concat9(const3,RAND),Ukey [j2]) in
let IK = prpcenc(concat9(const4,RAND),Ukey [j2]) in
let KASME = f(Uprfkey [j2], concat6(SQN ,CK , IK , h1)) in
new r2 : seed ;
let e2 = enc(concat7(h2,KASME ,RAND ,XRES , SQN ,MAC ),Rkey [j1], r2) in
event endAuthHU(h2,RAND,XRES);
event endAuthH(h2, h1,RAND ,XRES);
event endAuthH1(h2, h1,RAND, KASME );
c8[iH ]〈e2,mac(e2,Rmkey [j1])〉.
Fig. 12. CryptoVerif formalization of home network (HSS/AuC) actions in LTE AKA and LTE AKA+1
main = !i≤N cstart ();
new rKuh : keyseed ;
let Kuh = kgen(rKuh) in
new rmKuh : mkeyseed ;
let mKuh = mkgen(rmKuh) in
new r0Kuh : prfkeyseed ;
let prfKuh = prfkgen(r0Kuh) in
new rprpcKuh : prpckeyseed ;
let prpcKuh = prpckgen(rprpcKuh) in
new rKas : keyseed ;
let Kas = kgen(rKas) in
new rmKas : mkeyseed ;
let mKas = mkgen(rmKas) in
new rKsh : keyseed ;
let Ksh = kgen(rKsh) in
new rmKsh : mkeyseed ;
let mKsh = mkgen(rmKsh) in
new SQN : nonce ;
cstart 〈〉
(Q∗U |Q
∗
S|QH |QK |QL)
Fig. 13. CryptoVerif formalization of the main process, i.e. game G0, in LTE AKA and LTE AKA+1,
where, respectively, Q∗U = QU , Q
∗
S = QS and Q
∗
U = Q
+
U , Q
∗
S = Q
+
S
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U
IMSI , K0
S
SNid
H
{IMSI i,Ki}i
id request
IMSI
security related
information request
IMSI ,SNid
new RAND
SRES ← A3,K0
(RAND)
Skey ← A8,K0
(RAND)
auth vector response
RAND ,SRES ,Skey
RAND
RES ← A3,K0
(RAND)
RES
RES
?
= SRES
Fig. 14. The GSM Subscriber Identity Authentication Protocol.
SIA case, the specifications [12,11] are only concerned about adversaries that attack the radio
path, i.e. the connection between user equipment and base stations, while completely neglecting
other connections, including the connection between serving and home network. So it does not
violate the specifications even if there is no protection of the authentication vector response and
the session key is transmitted in the clear from the home to the serving network. An attacker that
is able to listen on the connections within the core network does not need to resort to the session-
mixup attack to successfully violate GSM security. We warn, however, that any GSM operators
that would like to protect the connection between home and serving networks need to correct the
GSM SIA protocol.
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